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1. Introduction
The study of digital innovations and their adoption by organizations has generated a 
field of research whose aim is to unravel analytical challenges such as the productivity 
paradox1 and establish an empirical knowledge base upon which scholars can build. Our 
research contributes to this on-going effort by focusing on the effect that digital network 
innovation adoption has over time on bank performance. The financial services sector was an 
early adopter of key technologies associated with business transformation and it is currently 
one of the most intensive users of information and communication technologies (ICT). While 
attention has been drawn to relatively poor gains from ICT investment in the financial services 
sector, findings from relevant research are inconclusive (Roach, 1991; Haynes and Thompson, 
2000; Beccalli, 2007; Kretschmer, 2012). Can strategic investments in certain information 
systems provide better explanations than broad analyses of a firm's aggregate IT investment 
(Aral and Weill, 2007)? The need for research here is acute because, practitioners and policy 
makers have scarce resources with which to base actions, and scholars lack the datasets and 
foundational knowledge claims about innovation adoption in financial services with which they 
can draw up agendas for future research. 
In an effort to address these challenges, we begin by examining the approaches used 
to-date in studies of digital innovation adoption in the financial services. We then add to this 
emerging knowledge base by presenting an analysis of adoption data from SWIFT, the 
financial digital network innovation developed in the 1970s to serve as the infrastructure for 
worldwide interbank payments communication. We construct and analyse a new dataset 
comprising SWIFT’s adoption history from 1977 to 2005 matched to bank-level performance 
data for the US, Canada and 27 European countries. Our analysis breaks from the majority of 
past research by utilizing a distinctive longitudinal approach to investigate claims in the 
literature. While there is now evidence of productivity benefits from ICT adoption, prior 
research has not considered whether these benefits are sustained in the long term. Our research 
focuses on the following questions. Firstly, is there evidence that ICT adoption generates long-
term benefits for firms? Secondly, do these benefits accumulate over time? Thirdly, do 
particular kinds of firms benefit more than others in the long term? Fourthly, what are the 
mechanisms underlying these benefits?  
Our findings determine the timeframe in which benefits from digital innovation 
adoption accrue and establish their correspondence with network effects. In so doing, we reveal 
* Corresponding author. Tel. +44 (0)24 765 22145. E-mail address: markos.zachariadis@wbs.ac.uk.
1 This trend was appropriately characterized by Robert Solow’s famous quote that ‘you can see the 
computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics’ (Solow, 1987), which eventually became 
known as the “Productivity Paradox” (Roach, 1991; Brynjolfsson, 1993). 
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surprising results concerning the performance of small banks relative to large banks. Small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) are frequently referred to as the ‘backbone’ of the economy 
because they play an important role in job creation (Brynjolfsson et al., 1994), technology 
investment, and GDP growth (Kuan and Chau, 2001) yet research about the effects of ICT 
adoption on their economic performance is sparse. There is a tendency in the adoption literature 
to treat small firms as “scaled-down” replicas of larger businesses (Raymond, 1985; Thong et 
al., 1996) and generalize about them based on large firm only datasets. We find small firms 
benefit disproportionately from SWIFT which is remarkable as this means overcoming scarce 
resources including relatively limited knowledge of technology management (Pfeiffer, 1992; 
Grandon and Pearson, 2004).  
Throughout the paper, we complement the quantitative analysis with an in-depth field 
study to explore the dynamic interplay between the process of adopting SWIFT and the 
mechanisms used to realise benefits from that adoption. We argue that this not only has 
implications for how firms can leverage ICT-investments but also suggests insights into 
adoption strategies for firms navigating the current business landscape in which potentially 
value-adding digital infrastructures are an integral part. In the next section, we will review the 
literature upon which we build our study. 
2. ICT adoption and firm performance
In the past, ambiguity concerning the economic impact of information and 
communication technology adoption or what has been termed the “productivity paradox” was 
hotly debated. Initial results during the 1980s and 1990s created concerns about whether ICT 
had any significant effect on economic output, but over the last couple of decades evidence has 
mounted confirming that ICT does yield sizable economic returns at both macro and micro 
levels (Brynjolfsson, 1993; Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2012). More specifically, a large 
number of recent studies report positive results from ICT investments on a range of measures 
relating to financial performance (Aral et al., 2006; Bresnahan et al., 2002; Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt, 1996; 2000; 2003; Dewan and Kraemer, 2000) 2. 
These findings are consistent with the Schumpeterian economic theoretical tradition 
that recognizes the importance of technological change and innovation as being the key drivers 
of economic growth and firm performance (see Romer, 1990; David, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 
2007). In this line of work, technological innovation plays a key role in explaining the dynamic 
2 For a more detailed review of the literature see surveys by Brynjolfsson and Yang (1996), and Draca 
et al. (2007). 
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properties of organizations (Cainelli et al., 2006). According to Schumpeter (1943), innovation 
puts in motion the mechanism of “creative destruction” in which technological advances 
override pre-existing market conditions. In the process, firms introduce new products, services 
and organizational processes thus gaining market share at the expense of their non-innovating 
competitors. Some are then able to leverage their new competitive position and gradually 
accumulate “monopolistic rents”, increasing their profitability still further (Cainelli et al., 
2006). 
Whilst the Schumpeterian approach is useful in describing the link between 
technological innovation and organizational performance, empirical evidence on the 
magnitude and nature of the contribution of technology seem to vary considerably across 
economies, sectors, and firms prompting much discussion about different measures of 
economic performance and innovation. For example, at the macro-level, most studies focus on 
measures of economy-wide productivity and labour productivity growth to make claims 
regarding the aggregate contribution of technology investment (Brynjolfsson and Yang, 1996). 
A case in point would be Gust and Marquez (2004) who analyse data from 13 OECD countries 
between 1993 and 2000 and find that ICT expenditure in this period is associated with higher 
productivity growth. Similarly, Oliner and Sichel (2000) demonstrate that ICT capital makes a 
significant contribution to the output growth rate of the US economy (between 0.6% and 1.1%) 
at various intervals during the period 1972-1999. Using data from the UK, Oulton (2002) found 
evidence of increased ICT contribution to GDP growth (up to 20.7%) for the years 1979-1998. 
Gordon (2016) provides a more sceptical perspective on the contribution of ICT to US growth, 
arguing that the main effects were all focused in the short window 1996-2004 period.  
Using economy-wide data is problematic as it is difficult to control for many other 
factors. More recent industry-level studies also found notable returns to ICT investments. 
Based on an analysis of 61 industries in the U.S., Stiroh (2002) uncovered evidence suggesting 
faster productivity growth – both total factor productivity (TFP) and average labour 
productivity (ALP) – in sectors that produced or used ICT more intensely. While several other 
studies have reported similar conclusions (e.g. Siegel and Griliches, 1992; Berndt and 
Morrison, 1995; etc.), it is apparent that the degree of the effect varies considerably between 
countries and industries. Stiroh (2002) found the strongest impact in IT-intensive services 
whereas others have found manufacturing to be more important (Baily, 1986; Roach, 1991). 
There has also been much recent work at the firm level. Here, most studies reveal a positive 
and significant correlation between the adoption of ICT and business performance. In a series 
of analyses using a large sample of company surveys, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1993; 1995; 
1996), report that ICT capital generates up to 10 times more output than other forms of capital. 
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Although, other papers have produced similar results that point to a positive effect from ICT 
adoption (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 1995; Oliner and Sichel, 1994; etc.), there is less agreement 
on the magnitude of the gains. In a meta-analysis of 20 econometric studies, Stiroh (2002), 
reports considerable variation with estimates of ICT-elasticity ranging from -0.06 to 0.24. Even 
though these are largely attributed to differences in production function specifications, the 
estimation techniques, and quality of data used, there are other important dimensions such as 
the timing and span of the sample period, the ICT-measures used (Evangelista, 2000), and the 
characteristics of the adopters included in the sample. Such variations in findings may also be 
because different types of technologies are lumped together as “ICT capital” or “computers.” 
(Weil, 1992; Baura et al., 1991).  
To move forward the research agenda on technology adoption, more detailed empirical 
data is needed, and Anderson et al. (2006) and Jun (2008) emphasise that this need is 
particularly urgent in the financial services sector especially with the current wave of “fintech” 
innovation where different technologies can have various effects on organisations (Evangelista, 
2000). To address this, we gather detailed firm-level data that incorporates larger samples of 
companies across longer periods to account for both sample selection bias and adjustments that 
take place over time. The availability of a long observation window offers us the unique 
opportunity to gain valuable information regarding the long-term impact of technological 
innovation on bank performance. 
2.1. Long-term outcomes from technological innovation adoption 
A key debate on the value of ICT has been the effect of technology on long-term 
profitability and its capacity to create sustainable competitive advantage (Clemons and Row, 
1991; Clemons, 1986). A long standing theoretical claim in this literature asserts that new 
technology adoption will offer benefits in terms of enhanced cost efficiencies, better product 
quality, and increased value to customers but the economic rents and value realised from these 
benefits will not last long due to the high imitability of ICT. Thus, the ICT applications adopted 
by firms have the status of “strategic necessities” and advantages from their early adoption and 
use are lost through imitation and do not lead to profitability increases (Clemons and 
Kimbrough, 1986; Fuentelsaz et al., 2012; Carr, 2003). This hypothesis largely relies on the 
assumption that ICT is highly commoditized and therefore easily replicable at a low cost (Carr, 
2003). In other words, it is expected that technology will be diffused and adopted 
homogenously – without ‘frictions’ or delays across competitor firms, a claim that is disputed 
in the technological diffusion literature where there are many factors that can prevent some 
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firms from speedily adopting a technology (Fuentelsaz et al., 2012). The counter claim holds 
that there are alternative ways with which organizations incorporate ICT into their productive 
process, use complementary assets, or reconsider their business strategy in light of 
technological change, which can lead to persistent differences in performance that cannot be 
accounted for by the strategic necessity hypothesis (Battisti et al., 2009). 
To address these fundamental arguments around long-term performance and 
sustainability we need a longitudinal approach which enables us to go beyond the short-term 
effects of technology adoption to reveal the varying temporal profile and impact of innovation. 
A few papers have attempted to focus on the long-term effects of ICT using micro data. (e.g. 
Kwon and Stoneman, 1995, for five manufacturing technologies or Haynes and Thompson 
(2000) on Automated Teller Machine (ATM) networks).  
We build our study upon two key insights from this prior literature both of which centre 
on the importance of constructing long lags. Firstly, intra-firm diffusion and technological 
adaptation often takes time (Tyre and Orlikowski, 1994; Fuentelsaz et al., 2009). Second, there 
is often the need for significant organizational changes and learning (Van de Ven, 1986; 
Brynjolfsson and Yang, 1996; David, 1990). Studies using short lags are unable to capture 
potential benefits that may accumulate over time from the technology investment. As 
Fuentelzaz et al. (2012) argue, the uneven patterns of technological diffusion mean that it is 
possible for benefits accrued by adopters (in comparison to non-adopters) to endure for several 
years depending on the timing of the diffusion process. Thirdly, beyond firm heterogeneity, 
particular focus must be given to the specific characteristics of network innovations and their 
strategic importance for long-term economic performance. 
Network externalities can arise when usage benefits increase with network size (Katz 
and Shapiro, 1985; Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Farrell and Saloner, 1992). For example, Saloner 
and Shepard’s (1995) show that as more ATMs are installed, the network size grows, making 
it hold higher value for cardholders and banks because the connectivity produced provides 
more utility. Although there are comparable results in other industries (Economides, 1996), 
empirical work on financial services network effects is in short supply and very focused on 
ATMs. This is cause for concern in a sector whose history has been defined by network 
innovations and network platforms are undergoing critical development. 
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2.2. Firm size and technology effectiveness 
There has been relatively little econometric research on the effects of ICT on smaller 
firms. For example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996) used data from some of the largest US 
corporations (367 firms generating approximately $1.8 trillion of gross output annually). Small 
organizations possess some unique characteristics that matter significantly when new 
technology is introduced (Raymond, 1985; Thong et al., 1996; Kuan and Chau, 2001). For 
example, the relative costs and risks from ICT adoption and implementation can be 
considerably higher for smaller firms due to their limited resources and lack of knowledge 
around technology management (Pfeiffer, 1992; Grandon and Pearson, 2004).  
In contrast to positive outcomes relating to the introduction and use of ICT in large 
organizations, research findings regarding the effect of technology in SMEs have been 
ambiguous at best. Empirical evidence from the literature on small business ICT suggests that 
a number of factors inhibit the uptake of technological innovation and impede the benefits of 
ICT adoption. These include a vital lack of financial resources with which to acquire ICT 
capital, invest in technological skills and achieve systems integration (Pfeiffer, 1992; Grandon 
and Pearson, 2004; Saunders and Clark, 1992). Similar results are also reported by Cragg and 
King (1993), who identify economic costs and shortage of technical knowledge as key barriers 
to ICT gains in the context of small organizations. Finally, Ballantine et al. (1998) identified 
distinctive features of SMEs such as narrow access to capital supplies, absence of business and 
IT strategy, and greater emphasis on using technology to automate (Zuboff, 1988). A more 
optimistic outlook is given by Dos Santos and Peffers (1995) who found inconclusive results 
regarding firm size and the impact of ICT on market share and income gains. Looking at a 
sample of banks and the benefits from ATM adoption they conclude that there are no 
economies of scale or scope for this technology that favour larger institutions in particular, 
however, they did not find any significant results to suggest that such a technology can 
specifically benefit smaller firms either. A similar view is shared by Lacity et al. (2014) who 
suggest that certain technologies, for example cloud computing can provide equal benefits to 
both large and smaller firms albeit in different ways.  
Of particular interest for our study are hypotheses that contradict the generally accepted 
view and suggest that small organizations may hold certain advantages over their larger 
competitors. For instance, perhaps smaller enterprises can adapt faster to internal and external 
changes in their operating environment, whereas larger organizations may respond slowly to 
technological transformation due to legacy systems that demand substantial modifications (Dos 
Santon and Peffers, 1995). Evidence of this would be remarkable because it would mean that 
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small businesses achieve benefits from ICT adoption that in the long run outweigh more 
obvious big firm advantages such as ample financial resources, ICT expertise, and economies 
of scale.  
The literature on the effects of ICT has shown that firms benefit mostly from cost 
reductions due to automation and increase of efficiencies in the production process and less 
from an increase in revenue streams. Bigger firms are commonly expected to be more efficient 
and thus anticipate better results in this regard (Hall and Weiss, 1967), but as we will go on to 
argue there is also evidence that despite their size smaller businesses may also achieve 
significant leverage from ICT adoption. Indeed, some of the existing literature points to the 
realisation of a range of benefits including operational savings, improvements in business 
processes, the cultivation of new markets, higher sales turnover and increases in profitability 
(Currie and Parikh, 2006; Kuan and Chau, 2001).  
In sum, thus far research examining the impact of ICT adoption on smaller firms, 
including mechanisms of value creation and the benefits generated has remained largely 
inconclusive. This leaves considerable scope for the study that we have undertaken here in 
which we ask not only if there is evidence that ICT adoption generates long-term benefits for 
firms but whether particular kinds of firms – small firms – benefit more than others in the long 
term. 
2.3. Financial technology and bank performance 
Traditionally, finance has been the highest spender across all sectors. For example, data 
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis measure computer (OCAM) expenditure in 
financial services between 32.5%-38.7%, from 1979 to 1992 (cf. Brynjolfsson and Yang, 1996; 
Griliches, 1995). Recent aggregate figures on technology investment worldwide place the 
banking and securities sector at the top of ICT spenders’ list with a total expenditure of $486.28 
billion– approximately 18% of the total technology investment or 24.8% if we include the 
insurance industry3. Consequently, the implications of ICT adoption and use for the global 
financial system have been fundamental. ICT did not only transform transaction processes but 
is also associated with shifting organizational boundaries (Scott and Walsham, 1998), 
facilitating the creation of new financial products, changing the nature of work (Barrett and 
3 Source: Gardner (September 2015). Manufacturing and natural resources followed with 476.55 
billion USD. These figures are based on real data and partial projections for 2015, however, ICT 
expenditure in 2014 follows a similar pattern. 
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Walsham 1999), globalizing financial markets (Sassen, 2002; Weber, 1994) and restructuring 
the character of financial intermediation (BIS, 2002).  
Some qualitative case studies have been used to study the effects of ICT on financial 
performance (e.g. Scott and Barrett, 2005; Clemons and Weber, 1990). For example, Autor et 
al. (2002) examine the introduction of automatic image processing on one of the top 20 US 
banks, arguing that the introduction of complementary organizational changes were crucial in 
understanding the impact on performance. In Weill and Olson (1989), the authors use six case 
studies to investigate the impact that the level of ICT investment has on firm performance. 
Their results, from a series of interviews with banking professionals, demonstrate the 
organizational complexities involved in defining ICT and difficulties encountered when 
searching for an appropriate measure to estimate the impact of technology. Such findings are 
particularly useful in order to understand the richness of processes and technology strategies 
in specific contexts, but are hard to generalise due to their specific nature. 
In terms of econometric studies on ICT in financial services, Casolaro and Gobbi (2007) 
estimate profit and cost functions for a panel of 600 Italian banks 1989-2000 and find that ICT 
capital intensive techniques significantly increase total factor productivity (TFP). Jun (2008), 
examines findings from several studies showing a positive relationship between ICT and 
banking performance, and also presents results indicating that ICT investments are associated 
with higher returns on assets in a sample of 22 South Korean securities firms. Similarly, 
Anderson et al. (2006) investigate the value implications of ICT investments on a panel of 62 
Fortune 100 banks and find that firm value increased on average with Y2K spending on 
technology. Also, Parsons et al. (1993) estimate a cost function using data from a single large 
Canadian bank between 1974 and 1987 finding a weak but significant correlation between 
productivity growth and the use of computers. Finally, Alpar and Kim (1990) explore the 
impact of ICT on the production of bank services finding that technology is cost saving, labour 
saving and capital using.  
Although these studies are useful in order to understand the general effect of ICT, 
treating technology as a single aggregated category makes it hard to disentangle which aspects 
of ICT led to performance increases and identify the dynamic effects of technology adoption. 
As a result, many authors have pointed out the scarcity of longitudinal studies examining 
particular ICT innovations in financial services. In a survey, Frame and White (2004) could 
only identify eight studies of which six use the same data on ATM diffusion (Hannan and 
McDowell, 1984; 1987; Sinha and Chandrashekaran, 1992; Saloner and Shepherd, 1995; etc.). 
Although they represent an important body of research, these studies focus more on the 
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diffusion of specific innovations and less on their impact upon business performance. Thus, 
Frame and White (2004) conclude that we have a lot of “talk” about financial innovation but 
“little action”. In other words, given the size and importance of the financial sector, the number 
of relevant studies is surprisingly limited and further scholarly efforts are needed.  
In this paper, we combine insights from several different research approaches. As a 
result, the approach taken here presents some distinct advantages, for example: firstly it 
proposes the in-depth investigation of a particular ICT-related innovation (SWIFT) in the 
banking sector rather than examining ‘general purpose technologies’ or ICT broadly, followed 
by an econometric analysis on the impact of SWIFT of bank performance. Secondly, the span 
of the data allows us to track the effects of SWIFT adoption in a large sample of banks (6,848 
in total) across 29 countries. Previous micro-econometric studies have limited themselves to a 
single country4 even though many industries, such as financial services, are international in 
scope. Thirdly, based on the whole population of SWIFT adopters we are able to track the long-
run effects of adoption (up to 30 years) which is important as the impact of innovation is 
unlikely to be realised in the short run (Geroski et al., 1993). Finally, in order to explore the 
impact of SWIFT adoption on bank performance and the value–creating mechanisms that come 
into play once the technology is implemented – for both small and large banks – we draw on 
insights from previous qualitative research (Scott and Zachariadis, 2012; 2014). The 
complementary data was gathered through archival research as well as interviews with SWIFT 
employees, bank executives, and domain experts who described the SWIFT implementation 
process, its cost and potential benefits for different kinds of financial services organizations. 
3. Overview of SWIFT and research setting
Our empirical analysis focuses on the adoption of an ‘inter-bank’ financial 
telecommunication network called SWIFT. Launched in 1973, SWIFT’s mission was to 
facilitate correspondence banking by automating communication between banks through the 
introduction of machine readable encrypted messaging standards, thus, enabling banks to send 
funds directly to counterparts at increased speed, in higher volumes, for reduced cost, and with 
improved security (Winder, 1985). In some regards, SWIFT can be compared to an electronic 
data interchange (EDI) or co-operative interorganizational system (IOS) allowing trading 
4 An exception to this is Beccalli (2007), who looks at a total of 737 banks in 5 European countries, 
however, the panel data used cover only 5 years in total and fail to identify any long-term effects 
which may last up to 10 years. 
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partners – in this case financial institutions – to “exchange structured business information5 
electronically” (Iacovou et al., 1995, p.466). SWIFT’s diffusion began with European-based 
banks and gradually moved to countries such as the US and UK (see figure 1)6. In this section, 
we provide a detailed overview of SWIFT’s proprietary communications platform: its network, 
the costs and benefits from its adoption, and its mission. We conclude by considering the 
assumptions made by practitioners in financial services about the benefits of SWIFT 
membership. 
Fig.1. SWIFT diffusion in eight chosen countries (1977-2006). 
 SWIFT has established itself as a trusted third party, functioning as the core gateway 
especially for large-value payments. Weirdt et al. (2005) described it “as an obligatory passage 
5 In the case of SWIFT these are financial messages such as instructions for payments, 
confirmations, settlement messages, letters of credit, securities transactions, and other types of 
standardized processes. 
6 Figure 1 presents the accumulative diffusion curve of all SWIFT adopters across eight of the 
countries in our sample between 1977 and 2006. Even though Germany led the way until approx. 
1985, the US and UK SWIFT population base grew substantially making these two countries the 
largest SWIFT adopters. As it can be seen the diffusion curve does not seem to follow the traditional 
“S” shape, which could suggest that the SWIFT diffusion process has not been completed by any 
means. 
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point to other parts of the transactional infrastructure, which gives it effective control of the 
[global] payment system”. Since its founding, there has been a working concord among SWIFT 
members to support its operation as a not-for-profit “industry co-operative”, reinvesting any 
surplus in process and product improvement. During its lifetime, there have been some 
business and connectivity ‘solutions’ in the tech market that engaged in competition, however 
they only accounted for a small fraction of business, and did not offer a comparable level of 
service or global coverage, nor they performed its standards and community development roles. 
 As the first network innovation of its kind in financial services, SWIFT necessitated 
the development of messaging standards to reduce operational complexity and advancements 
in network security protocols. Today SWIFT operates a highly reliable and secure IP network 
(SIPN) that offers a single window access to the financial world and allows for interoperability 
and high end-to-end automation (also known as “Straight-Through-Processing”) through a vast 
range of standards, technological applications and connectivity solutions. 
Fig.2. SWIFT implementation timeline 
3.1. Costs and benefits of SWIFT adoption 
The costs and benefits of adoption for different banks can vary significantly which 
means a thorough analysis of deployment (usage needs, interfaces, standards compliance, etc.) 
must be undertaken in the pre-implementation phase (see Figure 2). The main fixed costs relate 
to the original installation which includes all the items in the implementation phase. Once 
SWIFT is up and running (post-implementation stage) there are additional costs associated 
with maintenance, fees, training, software and hardware upgrades, and improvement expenses. 
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Going forward there may be further adjustment costs and subsequent software development to 
integrate the system with the internal banking processes. 
In contrast to the expenses, benefits are typically not realized until the infrastructure is 
properly configured and used. The benefits that SWIFT can be distinguished into intangible 
and tangible aspects. Potential intangible benefits are related to the reduction of operational 
risk and fraud (due to the less manual intervention and more secure transaction environment), 
enhancement of customer satisfaction, security and resilience, easier regulatory compliance, 
greater visibility and control (allowing for better cash management), reliability and timing. 
These benefits are difficult to measure and therefore are not directly dealt with in our study, 
however, we would expect that they can contribute towards profitability. 
Probably the most obvious tangible benefit, especially in the case of larger financial 
institutions, is the reduction of operating expenses. While the implementation of SWIFT can 
be a costly investment it is regarded as having a cost-saving effect. At a basic level, SWIFT 
replaces direct links to corresponded banks with a centralised cloud-based solution that allows 
member to contact anyone on the network (see figure 3). However, it also helps to reduce user’s 
costs by providing automation (through greater standardization and interfacing), security, 
speed, and economies of scale thus reducing marginal costs in the long-term via increases in 
labour productivity. These benefits extend across numerous business processes and 
transactions commonly used in banking such as payments, confirmations, financial reporting, 
pre-trade, trade, and post-trade activities. Interviews with financial services professionals 
enabled us to document this step-by-step progressive roll-out of SWIFT adoption through each 
business area. They confirmed that after the initial investment period, long-term operating costs 
decreased as SWIFT became further integrated into their back-office automated production 
systems.  
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Fig.3. Value added from SWIFT adoption 
Note: Figure 3 presents a detailed illustration of the mechanism through which SWIFT adds value in comparison 
to the old system of communication between banks (telex, FAX, and other proprietary networks). 
The mutuality generated by SWIFT’s industrial cooperative governance structure 
ensured a phase of initial reciprocal adoption by its founding members with subsequent 
momentum achieved by leveraging the counterpart banking relationship. In other words, firms 
compelled trading partners to connect as a condition of business. Large banks were able to 
assert new terms of business and thus realise the economies of scale promised by SWIFT 
adoption. Other smaller firms were actively recruited as SWIFT executives realized from the 
outset that network coverage was vital. Indeed, we documented on-going programmes to 
connect countries and enroll the widest possible range of financial institutions in our field 
study.  
SWIFT delivers very high reliability and is now a core part of the largely taken-for-
granted international financial services information systems infrastructure. Indeed, during our 
field study we frequently heard SWIFT referred to as the “plumbing” of international financial 
services. In other words, financial services professionals had come to regard SWIFT as a utility 
that fulfilled a basic but low-value facility. Moreover, its continued drive to reward high 
volumes led one interviewee to claim that SWIFT was built “by big banks, for big banks”. This 
value neutral “utility” status and the claim that its benefits accrue mainly to large financial 
firms, represents the dominant ‘industry wisdom.’ Neither claim has been systematically 
investigated, however.  
Challenging these active working assumptions lies beyond the mandate of the actors 
involved. SWIFT’s attention is on “lean management” and their main interest is in the analysis 
of members’ usage patterns along functional lines (rather than size of firm). By definition, 
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SWIFT membership relieves firms of the need to analyse core transactional network 
technology so that they can focus on developing other kinds of service innovation. Regulators 
have oversight but their attention is on audit, systemic risk and compliance. The impact of 
SWIFT adoption on firm performance thus remains a blind spot both in the financial services 
industry and the academic literature.  
4. Data and methods
 Our main dataset is the entire population of SWIFT adopters worldwide from 1977 to 
2006. This consists of the complete list of live SWIFT users operating on their “SwiftNet FIN” 
(or “SNFIN”) network – the most popular service and core SWIFT product – across 219 
countries and territories. Considering the complexity of the financial systems around the world 
and the constraints that are placed from national financial regulatory bodies, we also limited 
our initial analysis to Europe and the Americas. Since 1977, SNFIN has been adopted by 3,380 
banks in the 29 countries of our sample. 
 To this panel, we matched information from Bankscope, a global database containing 
information on more than 28,000 public and private banks (adopters and non-adopters of 
SWIFT) around the world. This is compiled by Bureau van Dijk (BVD), a European electronic 
publisher of business information. The database combines data from seven sources including 
Fitch Ratings, Capital Intelligence, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Moody’s, Standard and 
Poor’s etc. It includes all the information in the banks’ published accounts and is reasonably 
comprehensive in coverage. The product of this merge is a unique dataset containing a large 
sample of firm-level longitudinal information on ICT adoption and financial performance. Our 
financial data run from 1997 (the first year that Bankscope was produced) through 2006, but 
due to the small number of observations in years 1997 and 2006, we exclude them from our 
estimations and exploit the years from 1998 to 2005. After cleaning7 we are left with an 
unbalanced panel of 6,848 firms and up to eight years of financial data. 
7 We clean our dataset from extreme negative and positive values that appear in our factor inputs. We 
also avoid dropping the data by winsorising our performance variables on the top and bottom 
percentiles. Results are similar if we simply trim the outliers. 
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Table 1 
Country Statistics. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Country name Sample firms Percent 
Number of 
SWIFT 
adopters 
Percentage 
of SWIFT 
population 
Matched 
adopters 
in sample 
Proportion 
(%) of 
adopters 
in sample 
Austria 230 3.36 100 1.22 69 30.00 
Belgium 98 1.43 88 1.08 43 43.39 
Canada 83 1.21 62 0.76 31 37.35 
Cyprus 29 0.42 38 0.46 15 51.72 
Czech Republic 32 0.47 28 0.34 16 50.00 
Denmark 121 1.77 59 0.72 41 33.88 
Estonia 10 0.15 13 0.16 7 70.00 
Finland 19 0.28 22 0.27 7 36.84 
France 468 6.83 250 3.06 118 25.21 
Germany 1710 24.97 298 3.65 178 10.40 
Greece 23 0.34 41 0.50 19 82.60 
Hungary 40 0.58 43 0.53 25 62.50 
Ireland 70 1.02 81 0.99 37 52.85 
Italy 782 11.42 258 3.16 167 21.35 
Latvia 23 0.34 27 0.33 23 100.00 
Lithuania 10 0.15 12 0.15 10 100.00 
Luxembourg 115 1.68 148 1.81 83 72.17 
Malta 14 0.20 15 0.18 9 64.28 
Netherlands 101 1.47 98 1.20 45 44.55 
Norway 88 1.29 34 0.42 17 19.31 
Poland 52 0.76 47 0.57 39 75.00 
Portugal 47 0.69 45 0.55 31 65.95 
Slovakia 21 0.31 20 0.24 14 66.67 
Slovenia 20 0.29 23 0.28 17 85.00 
Spain 166 2.42 120 1.47 71 42.77 
Sweden 139 2.03 35 0.43 14 9.35 
Switzerland 539 7.87 270 3.30 162 30.00 
United Kingdom 455 6.64 538 6.58 177 38.90 
USA 1343 19.61 567 6.94 204 15.19 
Total 6848 100.00 3380 41.34 1689 24.66 
Notes: Our sample (first column) includes 6,848 firms from 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Adoption 
information is from 1977 to 2006. The third column contains data on the population of SWIFT adopters in the 
29 countries of our sample. Column 5 reports the number of adopters by country that were matched in the 
sample and column 6 reports what is the proportion (%) of the matched adopters in the whole sample. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics. 
Obs. Median Mean Stdev  
Variables 
Total assets (m$) 29970 729.43 10300 62000 
Total sales (m$) 29970 49.705 637.6793 3701.933 
Pre-tax profits (m$) 29970 5.936 104.894 759.944 
Employees 29970 164 1460.54 8479.635 
Operating expenses 
(m$) 
29901 20.1 259.637 1674.894 
 
Ratios 
Profit margin 29970 0.1384 0.1522 0.1524 
Return on assets 29970 0.61 0.7822 0.9919 
Return on equity 29946 7.43 8.5566 8.1563 
Cost to income 29789 67.13 68.337 29.8822 
Small Firms 
Total assets (m$) 14300 255.992 294.235 211.316 
Total sales (m$) 14300 17.273 22.053 27.465 
Pre-tax profits (m$) 14300 1.808 3.396 9.0938 
Profit margin 14300 0.1308 0.1418 0.156 
Big Firms 
Total assets (m$) 15670 2429.1 19400 84700 
Total sales (m$) 15670 162.521 1199.482 5054.607 
Pre-tax profits (m$) 15670 22.23 197.518 1042.361 
Profit margin 15670 0.1459 0.1618 0.1483 
Notes: Sample includes 6,848 firms in 29 countries, from 1998 to 2005; m$ = Millions of US 
Dollars. Small and Big firms are split according to the overall median of the Total Assets sample. 
In order for firms not to switch definition (between small and big) in our sample we first construct 
an average of the total assets for every firm. We then use this median for our split. 
In Table 1, we present our sample size by country including a separate column for SWIFT 
adopters. While SWIFT is adopted by many organizations including broker/dealers, 
corporates, custodians, investment managers, payment and securities market infrastructures 
(i.e. stock exchanges) and other non-financial institutions, we only keep the matched data from 
the SWIFT-Bankscope merge including the non-adopter firms from Bankscope. Thus, the 
resulting dataset exclusively contains banking institutions of all kinds existing in Bankscope. 
Looking down column (1), we see that almost a quarter of firms are in Germany (mostly due 
to the popularity of local savings banks known as Sparkassen) and almost one fifth in the US. 
Other countries which have many banks in the sample are the UK (6.6%), France (6.8%), 
Switzerland (7.9%) and Italy (11.4%)8. In order to avoid any duplication in our data we 
8 The 29 countries and 3,380 SWIFT adopters in our database cover 41.34% of the entire SWIFT 
population globally which is about 8,176 firms in 219 countries and territories. From the 3,380 SWIFT 
adopters we managed to match 1,689 onto the Bankscope database. As mentioned above, SWIFT is 
adopted by a number of non-banking organizations that are not included in Bankscope (about half). 
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excluded the unconsolidated accounts if we had their consolidated companions and used 
unconsolidated accounts of a subsidiary when there were no consolidated companions (results 
were robust when using only consolidated or only unconsolidated accounts).  
 Measuring productivity is extremely challenging in the financial sector, mainly due to the 
difficulties involved in developing an adequate price index for value added. In this paper, we 
focus on the profit margin defined as gross pre-tax operating profits divided by revenue (“return 
on sales”) as our key performance measure (we also compare the results to alternative 
normalizations such as assets or equity). Accounting profits can diverge from economic profits, 
but the two are likely to be correlated at the firm level and there is a tradition in industrial 
economics which supports using profitability as a key measure of firm performance (Slade, 
2004). 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. The median bank in the sample is not large: it has 
164 employees, sales of $49 million and $5.9m in profit. The profit margin is 0.13. Note, 
however, that the data is quite skewed as mean sales are $638m with a standard deviation of 
$3,702m. The other parts of the table break down the descriptive statistics by firm size and 
country. Profits are the difference of revenues and costs, so we also present results that 
disaggregate profitability into the revenue and cost components. We also examine the change 
in employment following SWIFT adoption as a further outcome. 
 Our main indicator of diffusion is simply an adoption dummy equal to unity in the year 
that the bank adopts SwiftNet Fin marked by the end of the post-implementation and the start 
of the “Live” phase (recall figure 2). It is unclear when the pre-implementation phase begins 
so we are careful to test for the exact timing (see below). In particular, it is likely that the 
benefits of SWIFT will not be observed in the first year, but instead there will be a longer-term 
dynamic at work between the introduction of SWIFT and its eventual effect on the bottom line. 
The fact that we have the entire history of all adoptions of SWIFT is helpful here because we 
are able to construct long lags back to 1978 for each firm. In other words, we are able (in 1998) 
to include up to a twenty-year distributed lag for SWIFT adoption to examine the dynamic 
effects on firm performance. 
 We do not have data on the intensity of usage of SWIFT for the whole period - some 
proxies exist in one or two years but these are not consistent across countries. Consequently, 
we focus on the simple adoption dummy as is standard in the diffusion literature. 
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4.1. Modelling strategy 
The main equation of interest is: 
(Π/S)it =  ∑  𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗=0  + β1Xit + ηi + Tt + εit    (1) 
Where (Π/S)it is the profit margin, the ratio of pre-tax profits to sales of firm i at time t. Xit 
denotes a vector of control variables such as the log of total assets to employees as proxy for 
the fact that firms of different capital intensity have different profit sales margins (e.g. if there 
are high fixed costs gross margins will be higher). We include a full set of firm fixed-effects, 
ηi to control for permanent unobserved heterogeneity (the country dummies are absorbed into 
this) and time dummies to control for macro-economic shocks, Tt. Finally, εit is an idiosyncratic 
error term whose properties we discuss below. SWIFTit is an adoption variable that is a binary 
dummy variable taking the value of one in the year of the “go-live” phase of adoption and all 
years after (and zero in the years before the go-live year). We allow a distributed lag up to L 
on this where empirically we estimate that L is approximately 9, in other words it takes about 
a decade for the full effect of SWIFT to play out on bank performance. This was also generally 
confirmed by the people we interviewed in banks. 
An econometric problem that arises while trying to estimate the effects of technology 
adoption on firm performance is unobserved heterogeneity. This occurs when there are many 
factors correlated with firm performance that we do not measure. In our case, this may create 
an upwards bias for the coefficient of SWIFT. We assume that these unobserved factors stay 
constant over time and we treat them as fixed effects. Then we proceed with our estimation by 
including a full set of firm-level dummy variables (the within-groups estimator). A problem 
with the fixed effects estimator is that it will exacerbate classical measurement error causing 
the SWIFT coefficient to be attenuated towards zero. But since this is administrative data there 
is probably little measurement error. A second concern, however, is that there may still be 
unobserved shocks, so that SWIFT adoption is correlated with the error term, εit .In the absence 
of an instrumental variable it is difficult to do much about this, but the fact that the main effects 
come not from the current variables but the long-lagged variables gives some reassurance that 
the positive effects we identify are not due to endogeneity bias. 
 Finally, note that all standard errors are clustered by firm to allow for arbitrary patterns of 
autocorrelation over time (serial correlation is typical in firm panels even after removing fixed 
effects). 
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5. Analysis and discussion of findings
 In the next part of the paper we report on our analysis and discuss the implications of our 
results for the research questions in our study. In the first sub-section, we consider whether 
there is evidence that ICT adoption generates long-term benefits for banks and whether these 
benefits accumulate over time. The timeline that is produced is important because whereas 
previous studies rest on aggregated or cross sectional data, our findings are based upon a 
longitudinal panel of data for a particular network technology. Next, we focus in more detail 
on whether particular kinds of firms benefit more than others in the long-term. Finally, we 
investigate the mechanisms through which SWIFT adoption adds value to banks in the long-
run and identify, among other things, network effects to be of significance. For each section 
we draw on insights from prior in-depth field studies, and discuss how we might interpret the 
benefits that we have identified and their implications for further research. 
5.1 The long-term effects of SWIFT adoption 
 Table 3 reports our basic regression results using the specification in equation (1). Column 
(1) simply regresses profitability on a nine-year distributed lag of SWIFT adoption (all columns 
include year and firm dummies). SWIFT appears to have a significant impact on firm 
profitability for up to 9 years. Lags at ten years and beyond were insignificant. As shown at the 
base of the column the sum of the SWIFT coefficients are significantly different from zero (p-
value = 0.0018) and the coefficients are jointly significant (p-value = 0.0006). The dynamics 
are interesting: there is little effect, even a negative coefficient in some of the early years of 
SWIFT on profits. The larger effects do not materialise for several years. We illustrate these 
dynamic effects in figure 4 which presents the cumulative effect of SWIFT over time. The 
figure illustrates that positive returns are not clearly visible until two years after SWIFT 
adoption and only gradually build up the long-run effect of 0.0823, which is sizeable. 
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Table 3 
SWIFT adoption and firm performance. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Sample All firms Small firms Large firms 
Dependent variable Π/Sit Π/Sit Π/Sit Π/Sit Π/Sit       
– 0.0358***
(0.0076)
0.0358*** 
(0.0076) 
0.0543*** 
(0.013) 
0.0268*** 
(0.0093) 
SWIFTit+1 – – 0.0155 
(0.0138) 
– – 
SWIFTit 0.0011 
(0.0177) 
0.0006 
(0.0171) 
–0.0087
(0.0162) 
0.0012 
(0.0273) 
0.0023 
(0.0216) 
SWIFTit-1 –0.0087
(0.0205) 
–0.0106
(0.0201) 
–0.0102
(0.0201) 
–0.0001
(0.0309) 
–0.0187
(0.0261) 
SWIFTit-2 0.0269* 
(0.016) 
0.0243 
(0.0159) 
0.0246 
(0.0158) 
0.0376 
(0.0288) 
0.0114 
(0.0155) 
SWIFTit-3 –0.0051
(0.0133) 
–0.0057
(0.0132) 
–0.0056
(0.0132) 
0.0059 
(0.023) 
–0.0162
(0.014) 
SWIFTit-4 0.0263** 
(0.0113) 
0.026** 
(0.0112) 
0.0262** 
(0.0112) 
0.0411** 
(0.0173) 
0.0105   
(0.0141) 
SWIFTit-5 0.038 
(0.0108) 
0.002 
(0.0108) 
0.002 
(0.0108) 
–0.0002
(0.0161) 
0.0028   
(0.0145) 
SWIFTit-6 0.0057 
(0.011) 
0.0055 
(0.011) 
0.0055 
(0.011) 
0.0027 
(0.0172) 
0.0074   
(0.0141) 
SWIFTit-7 0.0105 
(0.0104) 
0.0098 
(0.0104) 
0.0098 
(0.0104) 
0.0147 
(0.0171) 
0.0062   
(0.0132) 
SWIFTit-8 0.0034 
(0.0089) 
0.0026 
(0.0089) 
0.0026 
(0.0089) 
–0.0015
(0.016) 
0.0042   
(0.0105) 
SWIFTit-9 0.0184** 
(0.0077) 
0.0154** 
(0.0076) 
0.0155** 
(0.0076) 
0.0167 
(0.0135) 
0.0138   
(0.009) 
Sum of coefficients 0.0823 0.07 0.0618 0.1181 0.0238 
Mean of Dependent 
variable 
0.1522 0.1522 0.1522 0.1382 0.1652 
Significance of the sum of 
SWIFT coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0006 0.003 0.01 0.0024 0.4053 
Joint significance of 
SWIFT coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0018 0.0093 0.0096 0.0215 0.6004 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 5615 5615 5615 2832 2783 
Number of obs. 29970 29970 29970 14300 15670 
R2 0.6694 0.6726 0.6727 0.6622 0.6852 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by 
firm. All equations include a full set of country and year dummies. The dependent variable in all columns (Π/Sit) 
is the Profit Margin denoting Pre-tax Profits over Total Revenues (Sales). In all columns we include a 9-year lag 
structure to test the long-term effect of SWIFT on firm performance. In column 3 we have also constructed a 
lead to investigate the causal direction of SWIFT adoption and firm performance. In columns 4 & 5, we split our 
data between “Small” and “Big” firms we use a mean of the Total Assets of each firm as size indicator to make 
the categorisation. The time period of our sample is 1998-2005 (eight years). 
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Fig.4. Long-term returns from SWIFT. Notes: Figure 4 is a graphical representation of column (1) in 
Table 3. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on Profit Margin in the whole sample. Our 
full sample includes 6848 firms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Adoption data run from 
1977 – 2006 and financial data from 1998 – 2005.
Fig.5. Long-term returns from SWIFT. Notes: Figure 5 is a graphical representation of column (2) in 
Table 3. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on Profit Margin in the whole sample. Our 
full sample includes 6848 firms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Adoption data run from 
1977 – 2006 and financial data from 1998 – 2005.
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Fig.6. Long-term returns from SWIFT. Notes: Figure 6 is a graphical representation of column (3) in 
Table 3. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on Profit Margin in the whole sample. Our 
full sample includes 6848 firms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Adoption data run from 
1977 – 2006 and financial data from 1998 – 2005.
Column (2) includes the capital-labor ratio as an additional control, whose coefficient is 
positive and highly significant. The dynamics are illustrated in figure 5 and show an even 
slower build-up of profit margins than the previous column – the long-run effect falls to 0.07. 
Column (3) includes a lead in SWIFT to pick up whether there were costs in the year prior to 
the “go-live” year of SWIFT (figure 6). The coefficient is insignificant and actually positive 
rather than negative. This suggests either that the costs before the go-live point are insubstantial 
or that most of these are captured in the year when the go live period occurs (given that the 
implementation period may just be months). The first three columns all suggest a positive 
long-run impact of SWIFT on performance of between 0.06 and 0.08. Taking the lower bound, 
this is still an increase in profitability of around 40% throughout the ten years of SWIFT 
adoption, which is large9. 
 The positive and statistically significant effect of SWIFT adoption on firm performance 
(measured in terms of profit margin) is important because it challenges the practitioner notion 
of “the plumbing”. In other words, it overturns the prevalent assumption that adopting a 
network innovation like SWIFT is analogous to connecting a neutral system of ‘pipes’ with 
little or no effect. Archival material and interviews with practitioners involved in the founding 
9 The results are robust even when we put in country dummy and year dummy interactions 
(year*country) for all years and countries.  
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of SWIFT emphasised the effectiveness of its original mission to “kill telex”, eliminate 
telegrams, and stop facsimiles. Having such an easily communicated objective seems to have 
played a key role in adoption providing historical insight for innovation strategists. As for the 
focus of our study, rally cries to “kill telex” help us to understand increases in efficiency but 
are there further insights from our field study that can speak to more generative mechanisms at 
work? 
 As a ground-breaking network innovation, many problems were encountered not least of 
which was the realisation that multi-jurisdictional legal agreements would need to be drawn up 
if the status of its international messaging systems was going to be recognized. What emerged 
was a “community of practice” (Wenger, 1998) in which expertise of many kinds was pooled 
and made accessible to members. As one interviewee put it: “…the uniqueness of SWIFT was 
and still is today the absolute impressive accessibility…The great idea behind SWIFT was that 
this would be a platform for all financial institutions and that its advantage terms of cooperation 
should outweigh the individual benefits”. Banks that were normally competitors sent their staff 
to inter-organizational workshops to collaboratively examine the technical challenges of 
network innovation ranging from legal/regulatory issues, industry standards, process 
reengineering, organizational restructuring, and new approaches to management. A domino 
effect of process innovation followed as SWIFT updates rolled out and legacy systems were 
replaced as part of the adoption process.  
5.2 Firm size and financial performance 
 In columns (4) and (5) we repeat the analysis by splitting the sample into larger and smaller 
firms based on median assets10. The specifications are identical to column (2) and the dynamic 
responses are plotted in figures 7 and 8. The coefficients are much larger for smaller firms than 
bigger ones: smaller firms have a long-run SWIFT effect of 0.12 whereas this is only 0.02 for 
larger firms. Since the margins are larger for bigger firms the implied proportionate effect is 
even greater for the small firms than the large firms. A possible explanation for this is that the 
larger firms have to bear a lot more re-organization costs because of their legacy proprietary 
10 Median assets were calculated using all available financial data from 1998 – 2005. The results 
largely stay the same if we split our sample based on the number of employees instead of using total 
assets as a size indicator. In the Appendix we also include a breakdown of our sample in terciles 
reporting figures for small, medium and large banks (Table A9). The accumulative benefit decreases 
as the size of the firms in the sample increase confirming our initial findings that smaller firms benefit 
more from the adoption of SWIFT in the long-term.  
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systems. However, this does not explain the long-term difference in performance resulting from 
SWIFT adoption. 
Fig.7. Long-term returns in small firms. Notes: Figure 7 is a graphical representation of column (4) in 
Table 3. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on Profit Margin in the sub-sample of Small 
firms. Our full sample includes 6848 firms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Adoption data 
run from 1977 – 2006 and financial data from 1998 – 2005.
Fig.8. Long-term returns in big firms. Notes: Figure 8 is a graphical representation of column (5) in 
Table 3. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on Profit Margin in the sub-sample of Big 
firms. Our full sample includes 6848 firms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Adoption data 
run from 1977 – 2006 and financial data from 1998 – 2005.
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 In summary, and taking all columns together, we have two key results. First, there seems 
to be a positive and statistically significant effect of SWIFT adoption on firm performance 
(measured in terms of profit margin), and this effect appears to be substantial in magnitude. 
This is consistent with other recent findings on ICT and firm performance. Secondly this effect 
is much higher on smaller firms rather than big firms.  
 The result for small firms is important because by mapping this original data set onto a 
timeline for adoption benefits we are not only able to contribute baseline findings to the 
scholarly knowledge base but also raise a number of key questions for further research. For 
example, going forward, do we need to differentiate between network technologies such as 
EDI and ATM (the focus of prior literature) and network innovations which through their 
membership associate small firms with a mode of governance, audit and accountability that 
would otherwise be out of reach? If as a senior member of the executive team has suggested, 
SWIFT is “the first cloud”, can we claim that particular forms of network innovation serve, as 
Lacity et al. (2014) suggest, as “a great equaliser for SMEs [providing] an unprecedented 
opportunity to access economically the same IT infrastructure and software as large-sized 
firms”? Does SWIFT membership amplify small scale specialist offering with world-class 
infrastructure?  
 Our results mean we are also able to better reflect upon practitioner claims that SWIFT 
was developed “by big banks, for big banks”. Interviews with ‘SWIFT pioneers’ and founding 
members indicate that small banks were integral to its formation.11 According to our analysis, 
if we take a long-term view of SWIFT adoption we find consistent and significant evidence 
that small banks have both benefitted from SWIFT membership and been an asset to other 
members in the SWIFT network.  
5.3 Other outcomes: sales, expenses and labour 
 Table 4 presents the estimates of three other outcome variables: ln(Sales), ln(costs) and 
ln(labor-capital ratio). As in the previous tables, in all columns, we control for firm fixed effects 
and we include a full set of country and year dummies. The dynamic responses are graphically 
presented in Figures 9-11. 
11 One described SWIFT’s approach to members at the time of its found as follows: “…everybody paid the same 
tariff and they paid the same entry fee, it was really, you know, everybody’s on the same level, the small [local] 
bank […] to the big U.S. or big European bank”. 
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Table 4  
SWIFT adoption and sales, expenses and labour capital. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable log(Sales)it log(Opex)it 
log(Assets)it – 0.633*** 
(0.031) 
– 
 
SWIFTit 0.0386
(0.0646) 
0.0174 
(0.0473) 
–0.0162
(0.0468) 
SWIFTit-1 0.1569** 
(0.0714) 
0.0219 
(0.0395) 
–0.0527
(0.0385) 
SWIFTit-2 0.0813** 
(0.0373) 
–0.0217
(0.0249) 
–0.0708**
(0.0278) 
SWIFTit-3 0.0449 
(0.0308) 
–0.0473
(0.0303) 
–0.0165
(0.0312) 
SWIFTit-4 0.0605** 
(0.0247) 
–0.0146
(0.0249) 
–0.0067
(0.0239) 
SWIFTit-5 0.0064 
(0.0247) 
–0.0217
(0.024) 
–0.0504*
(0.0293) 
SWIFTit-6 –0.0078
(0.0271) 
–0.0131
(0.0258) 
–0.0043
(0.0298) 
SWIFTit-7 –0.0095
(0.0239) 
–0.0385*
(0.0221) 
–0.0196
(0.0239) 
SWIFTit-8 0.003 
(0.0252) 
–0.0102
(0.0202) 
–0.0232
(0.0236) 
SWIFTit-9 0.0327 
(0.0338) 
–0.0662***
(0.025)
–0.0846***
(0.0275)
Sum of coefficients 0.4072 –0.1939 –0.345
Mean of Dependent 
variable (level) 
653.6921 254.3271 –8.395
Significance of the sum 
of SWIFT coef. 
(Prob>F) 
0.0000 0.0023 0.0000 
Joint significance of 
SWIFT coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0022 0.0036 0.0007 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 6727 6720 5620 
Number of obs. 39395 39259 30039 
R2 0.9722 0.9822 0.9429 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Standard errors 
in brackets are clustered by firm. All equations include a full set of country and year 
dummies. The dependent variable in column 1 is the log of total revenues, in 
column 2 the log of operating expenses, and in column 3 the log of employees over 
assets. The time period is 1998-2005. 
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Fig.9. SWIFT effect on total sales. Notes: Figure 9 is a graphical representation of column (1) in Table 
4. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on the Total Revenues (Sales) of the firms of the
whole sample. Our full sample includes 6848 firms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). 
Descriptive Statistics of our variables are reported in Table 2. Adoption data run from 1977 – 2006 
and financial data from 1998 – 2005.
Fig.10. SWIFT effect on operating expenses. Notes: Figure 10 is a graphical representation of column 
(2) in Table 4. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on the Operating Expenses of the 
firms in the whole sample. Again we can observe the dynamic effect of SWIFT. According to our 
analyses on SWIFT, expenses are expected to increase the first two years of the technology 
implementation. After that, operating expenses experience a drop since automates a list of processes 
in the organisations. Our full sample includes 6848 firms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). 
Descriptive Statistics of our variables are reported in Table 2. Adoption data run from 1977 – 2006 
and financial data from 1998 – 2005.
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Fig.11. SWIFT effect on labour/assets. Notes: Figure 11 is a graphical representation of column (3) in 
Table 4. Here we observe a fall in the numbers of employees relatively to the assets of the firm 
sample. Our full sample includes 6848 firms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Description 
Statistics of our variables are reported in Table 2. Adoption data run from 1977 – 2006 and financial 
data from 1998 – 2005.
 Column (1) of Table 4 presents the sales equation. Sales are positively and significantly 
associated with SWIFT adoption: the long-run effect of SWIFT on sales is 41 log points, 
implying the firm sales increase by approximately 50% (= [exp(0.407) - 1]x100) over the 
decade when SWIFT was adopted. These results are consistent with our prior qualitative 
findings that SWIFT creates new revenue streams and results into an increase in sales. 
 The second column uses costs – operating expenses – as a dependent variable. Controlling 
for assets, we find that the first two years’ expenses actually increase and start to decrease only 
from the third year after adoption. The long-run effect is negatively correlated with SWIFT 
adoption and is statistically significant. The initial increase the long-term decrease of the costs 
is consistent with our story of how SWIFT affects firm operating expenses. While SWIFT in 
various cases demands a considerable initial amount of investment to implement and use, it 
substitutes different inputs that account for a large piece of the operating costs. From the results, 
we can presume that operating costs fall by approximately 20% in the 10-year period following 
SWIFT adoption. This is smaller than the proportionate increase in revenues, suggesting that 
SWIFT increases profits both by reducing costs and increasing demand, but the effect is 
stronger on revenues. 
 In column (3) we use the ratio of employees over assets as a dependent variable. There 
appears to be a substantial shakeout of workers relative to capital following SWIFT adoption, 
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presumably because SWIFT enables reductions in manpower. The results here are also 
statistically significant. 
 The above findings suggest that the value-added mechanism from SWIFT adoption does 
not only concern the reduction of operating expenses (due to efficiencies) as one would expect 
from the adoption of a production technology (Fuentelsaz et al., 2012). Through the 
enhancement of banks’ communication capabilities and the development of new standards, 
SWIFT provided the opportunity to increase firms’ transactional capacity, develop new 
products and services and create new markets that led to further revenue gains. One of the 
interviewees at a small bank, which has been back and forth with the decision to adopt SWIFT 
solely on the basis of cost reductions, said “…then there was a feedback from our marketing 
effort, which said that we would be able to increase our business, increase our volume, if we 
have SWIFT.” Being a network innovation, the benefits from SWIFT adoption rely largely on 
the number of network adopters that a bank is able to transact with over the SWIFT network. 
In the next section, we make an attempt to identify any existing network effects that boost the 
marginal benefit of SWIFT adopters as the size of the network grows.  
5.4 SWIFT network externalities 
 In table 5, we augment equation (1) to include a network variable defined as the cumulated 
aggregate number of SWIFT adopters in a country in a year from the entire SWIFT population. 
Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficients for network effects and lagged network effects 
respectively. In both columns we find a positive and significant coefficient on the network 
variable. Even though the coefficients seem small, they suggest a considerable profitability 
effect if the number of the adopters increases rapidly every year in each country. The literal 
interpretation of the current results is that, for every additional firm that adopts SWIFT in a 
specific country, other adopters will increase their average profit margin ratio by approximately 
0.0002. If the number of adopters for example grows by 10 in a country in a year, firms are 
going to benefit from another 0.002 increase on their profit margin (1.3%).12 
12 The full network effects are hard to credibly estimate as many are international rather than national. 
Unfortunately, the aggregate number of adopters is collinear with the time dummies so cannot be separately 
identified. 
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Table 5 
SWIFT network effects. 
(1) (2) 
Estimation method OLS OLS 
Sample All firms 
Dependent variable Π/Sit Π/Sit 
log(Assets)it 0.0362*** 
(0.0076) 
0.0362*** 
(0.0076) 
Network Effectjt 0.0001808*** 
(0.0000575) 
– 
Network Effectjt-1 – 0.0002741*** 
(0.0000547) 
SWIFTit 0.001 
(0.017) 
0.0013 
(0.017) 
SWIFTit-1 –0.0102
(0.02)
–0.0107
(0.02)
SWIFTit-2 0.025 
(0.0158) 
0.025 
(0.0158) 
SWIFTit-3 –0.0053
(0.0132) 
–0.0054
(0.0132) 
SWIFTit-4 0.0264** 
(0.0112) 
0.0264** 
(0.0112) 
SWIFTit-5 0.0023 
(0.0108) 
0.0023 
(0.0109) 
SWIFTit-6 0.006 
(0.011) 
0.0061 
(0.011) 
SWIFTit-7 0.0106 
(0.0103) 
0.0108 
(0.0104) 
SWIFTit-8 0.0033 
(0.0089) 
0.0034 
(0.0089) 
SWIFTit-9 0.0176** 
(0.0076) 
0.0183** 
(0.0076) 
Sum of coefficients 0.0765 0.0776 
Mean of Dependent 
variable 
0.1517 0.1517 
Significance of the sum of 
SWIFT coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0011 0.0009 
Joint significance of 
SWIFT coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0027 0.0020 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of firms 5615 5615 
Number of obs. 29970 29970 
R2 0.6730 0.6735 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Standard errors 
in brackets are clustered by firm. All equations include a full set of country and 
year dummies. The time period is 1998-2005. The Network Effect variable is the 
aggregate number of SWIFT adopters by country j and per year t from 1977-
2006. The Global stock variable is the accumulated number of SWIFT adopters 
globally per annum. Global stock * SWIFTit is the interaction between Global 
stock and the adoption dummy SWIFTit. 
Despite the challenges, we can say that network effects were significant to some degree 
for every firm that adopts SWIFT. In other words, every time a firm adopts SWIFT, other firms 
increase their profit margin. Taken with our other findings, it seems clear that over time firms 
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experience more than the straight forward replacement of one technology (telex) with another 
(SWIFT). ‘Over time’ is the key phrase here because we show that network effects are not 
some singular force of nature but rather that when network innovations become industry 
standards their sustainability depends upon a continued capacity to produce value for their 
members.  
Returning to our findings about small firms above, the qualitative data that we gathered 
is in line with evidence from Iacovou et al. (1995) who found that the primary reason for EDI 
adoption across small businesses is external pressure from trading partners (especially larger 
institutions) seeking to reduce ongoing operating costs with counterparties (Kuan and Chau, 
2001). As one of the original SWIFT implementation team put it, “If you were not on SWIFT 
but, you know, 25 other banks were, you were going to lose the business, because the other 
banks who were ‘on’ are not going to go back to sending telexes.”   Complying with such 
pressure may have brought initial difficulties for small banks but over time they benefit from 
access to a wider range of potential clients with whom they can securely transact. 
We close our exploration of innovation adoption and network effects by posing a 
question for further research: does our study of SWIFT adoption suggest (following Bonardi 
and Durrand 2003) that network effects can be managed? As one interviewee said when asked 
about the active on-boarding of small bank members during the early years of SWIFT adoption: 
“In general, during the development period, the biggest support came from the small-to-
medium size banks who always have been the pro SWIFT…If we had created a SWIFT 
banking community and a non-SWIFT banking community, the SWIFT banking community 
would have suffered as much as the non-SWIFT banking community…I mean it’s like making 
a road only for BMW’s, it doesn’t fit, the philosophy is wrong.” Do our findings about small 
firms and network effects point to the possibility that relational governance has the potential to 
influence how adoption benefits evolve over time? 
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we focus on the impact of ICT adoption on the performance of firms in the 
financial services sector using an original dataset from SWIFT, one of the first and probably 
the most widely used network technologies in the banking world. SWIFT has been part of the 
core financial infrastructure for over 40 years; it provides global information processing 
services, transmits more than 20 million transaction messages a day, and effectively serves as 
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the world’s most reliable third party network. Yet for most of its history it has ‘flown under 
the radar’. Most people will have a SWIFT code in the corner of their bank account statement 
and many will have used it when making an international funds transfer but few know anything 
about its founding, development, operations or impact.  
 Using an uncommonly rich longitudinal panel of data on 6,848 banks in 29 countries in 
Europe and North America we construct long lags and investigate the dynamics characterizing 
the effect of SWIFT adoption on firm performance. We provide robust evidence that SWIFT 
adoption has a positive and significant association with firm performance even after controlling 
for many factors, including firm fixed effects. Our main results show that the returns from 
SWIFT can take up to ten years to be fully realised. As expected for most technology 
investments, we observe an extremely weak or negative result within the first few years of the 
adoption of SWIFT. This is consistent with previous findings that demonstrate that 
technological and organizational changes take time to implement and realise the benefits. 
Additionally, the profitability effects of SWIFT derive mainly from an increase in sales, not 
just a fall in long-term operating expenses (due to fewer employees per unit of capital). We 
believe that the most interesting result to emerge from our analysis – beyond the positive impact 
on performance (measured in terms of profit margin) and evidence of network effects – is the 
realisation that smaller firms benefit from relatively higher returns than the larger ones.  
 There are many outstanding issues and areas for further research here which will intrigue 
scholars of ICT adoption, particularly those specialising in financial services. Using additional 
data from an in-depth field study, we explore potential generative mechanisms that may be 
implicated in the benefits of adoption. We point to the ‘domino’ effect as SWIFT network 
innovations are enfolded into “productive process advances” (Fuentelsaz et al., 2009, p.1174), 
the value that access to a community of practices has for SME’s, and SWIFT’s role as a non-
state actor working with legislators to write the legal terms for international business when 
gaps between national jurisdictions were discovered. Aware that scholars are interested in the 
specific characteristics of network innovations in order to understand their distinctive strategic 
importance (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Farrell and Saloner, 1985), we note that SWIFT is an 
industry cooperative. In other words, SWIFT was funded and developed through voluntary 
action rather than being created by regulatory instruction and as a mutual it rebates profit to its 
members each year. This leads us to ask not only whether SWIFT membership provides 
(especially small firms) access with a mode of governance, audit and accountability that would 
otherwise be out of reach but also whether this points to the possibility of using relational 
governance to manage network effects. Finally, but not insignificantly, we overturn a number 
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of assumptions about SWIFT in the practitioner community. We would suggest that it is 
important for financial services organizations not only to ‘know your customer’ but also to 
‘know thyself’. Our findings reinforce the need to explore, substantiate and then pursue 
evidence-based strategy when making ICT investments in the evolving financial services 
technoscape. 
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Appendix A. Definitions, descriptive statistics, and selected results using alternative 
specifications  
Table A1 
SWIFT adoption and firm performance. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS 
Sample All firms 
Dependent variable ROAit ROEit C/Iit     
SWIFTit 0.0343 
(0.0854) 
–0.5141
(0.742) 
0.7632 
(3.9223) 
SWIFTit-1 –0.1119
(0.0971) 
–0.8495
(0.7396) 
–1.3863
(4.7286) 
SWIFTit-2 0.0223 
(0.085) 
0.5512 
(0.6489) 
–5.6947
(4.633) 
SWIFTit-3 0.023 
(0.0782) 
0.2414 
(0.6768) 
–0.51
(4.0055) 
SWIFTit-4 0.139* 
(0.0737) 
0.9697 
(0.611) 
–3.0426
(3.0944) 
SWIFTit-5 0.0035 
(0.0706) 
0.1633 
(0.6274) 
2.1921 
(2.518) 
SWIFTit-6 0.0418 
(0.0643) 
–0.1904
(0.5242) 
–1.6541
(3.178) 
SWIFTit-7 0.0445 
(0.0618) 
0.5961 
(0.5321) 
–0.7196
(1.8542) 
SWIFTit-8 0.0055 
(0.0621) 
–0.3878
(0.5107) 
–2.2
(1.3238) 
SWIFTit-9 0.0236 
(0.0619) 
0.5366 
(0.5092) 
–1.6793
(1.4007) 
Sum of coefficients 0.2257 1.1165 –13.9313
Mean of Dependent 
variable  
0.7751 8.3774 68.149 
Significance of the sum of 
SWIFT coef. (Prob>F) 
0.1238 0.3507 0.0023 
Joint significance of 
SWIFT coef. (Prob>F) 
0.4117 0.3680 0.1101 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 6754 6739 6624 
Number of obs. 39661 39602 38785 
R2 0.6258 0.6052 0.5830 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Standard 
errors in brackets are clustered by firm. All equations include a full set of 
country and year dummies. The dependent variable in column 1 is Return 
on Assets, in column 2 Return on Equity, and in column 3 Cost to Income 
Ratio. The time period is 1998-2005. 
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Table A2 
Definition of measures. 
 
Measures Ratio Description 
Performance   
Profit Margin Pretax Income/Sales 
(PCM) 
Increase in PCM indicates higher 
Profits generated by Sales 
Return on Assets Pretax Income/Assets 
(ROA) 
Increase in ROA indicates higher 
Profits generated by Assets 
Return on Equity Pretax Income/Equity 
(ROE) 
Increase in ROE indicates higher 
Profits generated by Equity 
Efficiency   
Cost to Income Operating Expenses 
(OPEX)/Operating 
Income 
Efficiency Inverse Ratio: the higher 
the ratio, the worse the perceived 
efficiency 
Notes: This table includes the definitions of the main ratios that we use in our analysis. We have 
categorized them into two distinct groups: Performance measures and Efficiency measures. 
Performance ratios measure the returns of SWIFT, whereas, efficiency ratios measure the costs 
behaviour of the banks relative to their Profits and Assets. Efficiency ratios are both inverse 
ratios. 
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Table A3 
Descriptive statistics on SWIFT adopters. 
 
 
Mean Size 
(Total Assets 
in millions$) 
Mean 
Profit 
Margin 
Number of 
Adopters 
Number of 
Firms 
     
SWIFT adopters     
early 1977-1999 22200 0.1648 1108  
late 2000-2006 9459.479 0.134 263       
In our sample     
1998-2005 10100 0.1352 329  
1998-1999 9519.264 0.1546 98  
2000-2005  10400 0.1264 231       
Non-adopters     
whole sample 5945.563 0.1496  5159 
Notes: Sample includes 6,848 firms in 29 countries, from 1998 to 2005; millions$ = Millions of 
US Dollars. Figures reported here are the ones used in the regressions in table A4. In total 
6,530 firms are being utilized by the regressions from which 1,371 are SWIFT adopters (1,108 
+ 263), and 5,159 are non-adopters. We can observe that early adopters that adopted SWIFT 
before 2000 are bigger in size than firms that adopted SWIFT after 2000. The smallest firms in 
our sample are the ones that haven’t adopted SWIFT yet, however, these are not necessarily 
the least profitable in terms of Profit Margins. 
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Table A4 
SWIFT adoption and firm performance – robustness checks. 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Estimation method OLS OLS  OLS OLS 
Sample All firms  SWIFT adopters 
Dependent variable Π/Sit Π/Sit  Π/Sit Π/Sit 
 0.0404
***   
(0.0084) 
–  0.0509*** 
(0.0098) 
– 
log(Assets)it – 0.0119* 
(0.0066) 
 – 0.0133  
(0.0098)       
SWIFTit 0.0014   
(0.0168) 
–0.0023 
(0.0153) 
 –0.0012   
(0.017) 
–0.0052 
(0.0155) 
SWIFTit-1 –0.0015    
(0.0191) 
–0.0054 
(0.0178) 
 –0.0106  
(0.02) 
–0.0052 
(0.0177) 
SWIFTit-2 0.0172   
(0.0157) 
0.0133 
(0.0141) 
 0.0227   
(0.0158) 
0.012   
(0.0141) 
SWIFTit-3 –0.0073   
(0.0125) 
0.0072 
(0.0121) 
 –0.0069   
(0.0133) 
0.0055   
(0.0122) 
SWIFTit-4 0.0206*   
(0.0112) 
0.0184* 
(0.0104) 
 0.025**   
(0.0112) 
0.017   
(0.0105) 
SWIFTit-5 0.0015 
 (0.01) 
0.001 
(0.0106) 
 0.0015   
(0.0109) 
0.0009   
(0.0106) 
SWIFTit-6 0.0032   
(0.0095) 
0.0028 
(0.0103) 
 0.0056   
(0.011) 
0.0021   
(0.0104) 
SWIFTit-7 0.0027   
(0.0098) 
0.0096 
(0.0096) 
 0.0086   
(0.0104) 
0.0081   
(0.0097) 
SWIFTit-8 0.0009 
(0.009) 
0.0098 
(0.0093) 
 0.0028  
(0.0091) 
0.0093   
(0.0093) 
SWIFTit-9 0.0167**   
(0.0077) 
0.013 
(0.0083) 
 0.0128   
(0.0079) 
0.0107   
(0.0086) 
Sum of coefficients 0.0555 0.0672  0.0604 0.0554 
Mean of Dependent 
variable 
0.1522 0.1517  0.1593 0.1584 
Significance of the sum of 
SWIFT coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0155 0.0020  0.0274 0.0296 
Joint significance of SWIFT 
coef. (Prob>F) 
0.2009 0.0299  0.1387 0.3271 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of firms 5615 6727  1371 1642 
Number of obs. 29970 39393  7320 9357 
R2 0.6919 0.6778  0.6337 0.6271 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. In this table we perform some robustness 
check on the relationship between SWIFT adoption and firm performance. Standard errors in brackets are 
robust to heteroskedacity and autocorrelation of unknown form and are clustered by firm. All equations include 
a full set of country and year dummies and in column 1 their interaction. In all columns we include a 9-year 
lag structure to test the long-run effect of SWIFT on firm performance. We test our data using the whole sample 
(col. 1 and 2), and SWIFT adopters sample (col. 3 and 4). 
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Table A5 
SWIFT adoption and firm performance – robustness checks. 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Estimation 
method 
OLS OLS  OLS OLS  OLS OLS 
Sample Commercial Banks  Non-Commercial 
Banks 
 Selection of Banks 
Dependent 
variable Π/Sit Π/Sit  Π/Sit Π/Sit  Π/Sit Π/Sit 
 0.0395
*** 
(0.013) 
–  0.0319*** 
(0.0088) 
–  0.0391*** 
(0.009) 
– 
log(Assets)it – 0.0137 
(0.01) 
 – 0.0098  
(0.0089) 
 – 0.016** 
(0.0076)          
SWIFTit 0.0005   
(0.0261) 
–0.0076   
(0.0235) 
 –0.001   
(0.0207) 
–0.0004 
(0.0179) 
 –0.0086   
(0.0209) 
–0.0103   
(0.0184) 
SWIFTit-1 –0.0052   
(0.0255) 
–0.0041   
(0.0234) 
 –0.0194  
(0.0332) 
–0.0085 
(0.0277) 
 –0.0205   
(0.0241) 
–0.0166   
(0.0209) 
SWIFTit-2 0.0209   
(0.0175) 
0.0116   
(0.0166) 
 0.0273   
(0.0308) 
0.0108   
(0.0255) 
 0.0287   
(0.0181) 
0.0163   
(0.016) 
SWIFTit-3 –0.0043   
(0.0165) 
0.012   
(0.0158) 
 –0.0141   
(0.0208) 
–0.0089   
(0.0172) 
 –0.0096   
(0.0146) 
0.0072   
(0.0136) 
SWIFTit-4 0.0319**   
(0.0137) 
0.0235**   
(0.0128) 
 0.0055  
(0.0181) 
0.0005   
(0.018) 
 0.0327***   
(0.0117) 
0.0241**   
(0.0112) 
SWIFTit-5 0.0000   
(0.0137) 
–0.0018   
(0.0134) 
 0.0018   
(0.0156) 
0.0017   
(0.0169) 
 –0.0013   
(0.0117) 
–0.0005   
(0.0114) 
SWIFTit-6 0.0116 
(0.0127) 
0.0112 
(0.0131) 
 –0.014   
(0.0211) 
–0.0193   
(0.0164) 
 0.0063 
(0.0111) 
0.0057 
(0.0108) 
SWIFTit-7 0.0191 
(0.0117) 
0.0122 
(0.0113) 
 –0.0171   
(0.0213) 
–0.0037   
(0.0181) 
 0.0087 
(0.0105) 
0.0053 
(0.0099) 
SWIFTit-8 –0.0014 
(0.0107) 
0.005 
(0.0109) 
 0.0044  
(0.0161) 
0.0125   
(0.0176) 
 –0.0004 
(0.0094) 
0.006 
(0.0093) 
SWIFTit-9 0.0171* 
(0.0092) 
0.0175* 
(0.0098) 
 0.0041   
(0.0139) 
–0.0059   
(0.0155) 
 0.0153* 
(0.0082) 
0.0195** 
(0.0086) 
Sum of 
coefficients 
0.0902 0.0796  –0.0225 –0.0211  0.0513 0.0567 
Mean of 
Dependent 
variable 
0.1717 0.1629  0.1445 0.1474  0.1601 0.1554 
Significance of 
the sum of 
SWIFT coef. 
(Prob>F) 
0.0045 0.0085  0.5608 0.5222  0.0507 0.0193 
Joint 
significance of 
SWIFT coef. 
(Prob>F) 
0.0059 0.0460  0.9422 0.9811  0.0110 0.0170 
         
Firm fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of 
firms 
1565 1910  4050 4817  3903 4659 
Number of obs. 8516 10840  21454 28553  21272 27516 
R2 0.6552 0.6452  0.6829 0.6165  0.6625 0.6575 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. In this table we perform some 
robustness check on the relationship between SWIFT adoption and firm performance. Standard 
errors in brackets are robust to heteroskedacity and autocorrelation of unknown form and are 
clustered by firm. All equations include a full set of country and year dummies and in column 1 their 
interaction. In all columns we include a 9-year lag structure to test the long-run effect of SWIFT on 
firm performance. We test our data using Commercial Banks sample (col. 1 and 2), Non-
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Commercial Banks and other financial institutions sample (col. 3 and 4), and a selection of Financial 
Institutions1 (col. 5 and 6). 
 
 
Table A6 
SWIFT adoption and firm performance – robustness checks. 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Estimation method OLS OLS  OLS OLS 
Sample All firms  All firms 
Dependent variable Π/Sit Π/Sit  Π/Sit Π/Sit 
 0.023
**   
(0.009) 
–  – – 
 0.0149
**   
(0.0073) 
–  0.0247*** 
(0.0076) 
– 
log(Assets)it – –0.0008 
(0.009) 
 – – 
log(Assets)it-1 – 0.0011 
(0.0073) 
 – 0.0007  
(0.0073)       
SWIFTit 0.0113   
(0.0214) 
0.008 
(0.0171) 
 0.0115   
(0.0214) 
0.0079 
(0.0171) 
SWIFTit-1 –0.025    
(0.0243) 
–0.016 
(0.019) 
 –0.0274  
(0.024) 
–0.0161 
(0.019) 
SWIFTit-2 0.0127   
(0.0199) 
0.009 
(0.0164) 
 0.016   
(0.0191) 
0.0091   
(0.0164) 
SWIFTit-3 0.004   
(0.0143) 
0.0093 
(0.0135) 
 0.0028   
(0.014) 
0.0093   
(0.0135) 
SWIFTit-4 0.0238**   
(0.0107) 
0.0191* 
(0.011) 
 0.0172   
(0.0113) 
0.019*   
(0.011) 
SWIFTit-5 0.0053 
 (0.0104) 
0.0061 
(0.0106) 
 0.0117   
(0.0109) 
0.0061   
(0.0105) 
SWIFTit-6 –0.0029   
(0.0109) 
–0.0081 
(0.0105) 
 –0.0074   
(0.0106) 
0.0081   
(0.0105) 
SWIFTit-7 0.0078   
(0.0109) 
0.0086 
(0.0098) 
 0.0115   
(0.0107) 
–0.0085   
(0.0098) 
SWIFTit-8 –0.0043 
(0.0092) 
0.0012 
(0.009) 
 –0.005  
(0.0093) 
0.0012   
(0.009) 
SWIFTit-9 0.0144   
(0.0088) 
0.0087 
(0.0095) 
 0.0135   
(0.0087) 
0.0087   
(0.095) 
Sum of coefficients 0.0471 0.0458  0.0443 0.0457 
Mean of Dependent 
variable 
0.1582 0.1545  0.1554 0.1545 
Significance of the sum 
of SWIFT coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0859 0.0652  0.1134 0.065 
Joint significance of 
SWIFT coef. (Prob>F) 
0.1023 0.3932  0.1338 0.391 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of firms 5061 6504  5253 6504 
Number of obs. 23347 32554  24746 32554 
R2 0.7054 0.6938  0.6956 0.6938 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. In this table we perform some 
robustness check on the relationship between SWIFT adoption and firm performance. Standard 
errors in brackets are robust to heteroskedacity and autocorrelation of unknown form and are 
clustered by firm. 
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Table A7 
Bank specialisations in the sample. 
 
Bank Specialisations Number of Firms 
SWIFT 
Adopters 
(firms) 
SWIFT Non-
adopters 
(firms)     
Bank Holding & Holding Companies1 717 38 679 
Central Banks 28 27 1 
Commercial Banks1 1927 1034 893 
Cooperative Banks1 1620 87 1533 
Investment Banks /Securities Houses1 498 226 272 
Islamic Banks 1 1 0 
Medium & Long Term Credit Banks 48 18 30 
Multi-lateral Governmental Banks 2 1 1 
Non-banking Credit Institutions 463 52 411 
Real Estate /Mortgage Banks 189 31 158 
Savings Banks 1280 138 1142 
Specialised Governmental Credit 
Institutions 
75 36 39 
    
 6848 1689 5159 
Notes: Sample includes 6,848 firms (205,440 observations) in 29 countries, from 1977 to 2006. 
1These banks are included in the sample for columns (5) and (6) in Table A5. 
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Table A8 
SWIFT early and late adopters. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation 
method 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Sample All firms Years ≤2001 
Years 
≥2002 
Type of SWIFT 
adopters Early Early Late All All 
Dependent 
variable 
Π/Sit Π/Sit Π/Sit Π/Sit Π/Sit 
 0.029
***   
(0.0078) 
0.0297***   
(0.0078) 
0.0351*** 
(0.01) 
0.0283*** 
(0.0098) 
0.044*** 
(0.0169) 
      
SWIFTit –0.0096   
(0.0245) 
–0.0105   
(0.0245) 
–0.0014 
(0.0194) 
–0.0046 
(0.0258) 
0.0148 
(0.0351) 
SWIFTit-1 –0.0069    
(0.0247) 
–0.0078    
(0.0247) 
–0.0206 
(0.0272) 
–0.0047 
(0.0192) 
–0.0158 
(0.0425) 
SWIFTit-2 –0.0024   
(0.0205) 
–0.0037   
(0.0205) 
0.0439* 
(0.023) 
0.0024 
(0.0202) 
0.0592* 
(0.0345) 
SWIFTit-3 –0.0155   
(0.0185) 
–0.017   
(0.0185) 
0.0134 
(0.0155) 
0.0071 
(0.016) 
0.0075 
(0.0184) 
SWIFTit-4 0.0278*   
(0.0146) 
0.0269*   
(0.0146) 
0.035* 
(0.0181) 
0.0149 
(0.0181) 
0.0692*** 
(0.0214) 
SWIFTit-5 0.0042 
 (0.0121) 
0.0172 
 
(0.0107) 
0.0102 
(0.0213) 
0.0339* 
(0.0187) 
–0.0025 
(0.0166) 
SWIFTit-6 0.0084   
(0.0112) 
  0.0143 
(0.0186) 
0.0018 
(0.0198) 
SWIFTit-7 0.0093   
(0.0104) 
  0.022 
(0.0206) 
0.0033 
(0.0138) 
SWIFTit-8 0.0024 
(0.0089) 
  0.0291 
(0.0202) 
–0.0082 
(0.0097) 
SWIFTit-9 0.0157**   
(0.0076) 
  0.0073 
(0.0155) 
0.0072 
(0.0131) 
Sum of 
coefficients 
0.0335 0.005 0.0806 0.1216 0.1366 
Mean of 
Dependent 
variable 
0.1531 0.1386 0.1491 0.1406 0.1616 
Significance of 
the sum of 
SWIFT coef. 
(Prob>F) 
0.4066 0.8986 0.0087 0.0122 0.0414 
Joint significance 
of SWIFT coef. 
(Prob>F) 
0.0405 0.0915 0.0647 0.2090 0.1089 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 5352 5352 4507 4233 5260 
Number of obs. 28654 28654 23966 13354 16616 
R2 0.6729 0.6725 0.6903 0.7725 0.7775 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. In this table we investigate 
the SWIFT-effects in two separate sub-samples: early SWIFT adopters (from 1977 to 1999) 
in columns 1 and 2, and late SWIFT adopters (from 2000 to 2006) in column 3. In columns 4 
and 5 we run two additional regressions using a sample of all the observations prior 2002 and 
after 2002 respectively. Standard errors in brackets are robust to heteroskedacity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form and are clustered by firm. All equations include a full set of 
country and year dummies.  
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Table A9 
Small and large firms in terciles. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable  Π/Sit  
Firm size Small Q1 Medium Q2 Large Q3 
 0.0750
***  
(0.0200) 
0.0285***  
(0.0086) 
0.0239**  
(0.0118) 
    
SWIFTit –0.0291  
(0.0348) 
0.0048   
(0.0312) 
0.0204   
(0.0228) 
SWIFTit-1 –0.0174  
(0.0403) 
0.0284  
(0.0417) 
–0.0305  
(0.0258) 
SWIFTit-2 0.0605   
(0.0373) 
0.0121   
(0.0292) 
0.0003   
(0.0173) 
SWIFTit-3 0.0102   
(0.0314) 
–0.0129   
(0.0215) 
–0.0159   
(0.0165) 
SWIFTit-4 0.0684***   
(0.0239) 
0.0096   
(0.0178) 
0.0179   
(0.0162) 
SWIFTit-5 0.0023   
(0.0244) 
0.0147   
(0.0170) 
–0.0123   
(0.0158) 
SWIFTit-6 –0.0149   
(0.0299) 
0.0065   
(0.0151) 
0.0188   
(0.0161) 
SWIFTit-7 0.0059   
(0.0268) 
0.0393**   
(0.0155) 
–0.0183   
(0.0152) 
SWIFTit-8 0.0042  
(0.0257) 
–0.0134  
(0.0138) 
0.0165  
(0.0103) 
SWIFTit-9 0.0259**   
(0.0214) 
–0.0018   
(0.0109) 
0.0173   
(0.0107) 
Sum of coefficients 0.2069 0.0711 0.0142 
Mean of Dependent 
variable 
0.1400 0.1475 0.1682 
Significance of the sum of 
SWIFT coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0090 0.0442 0.6731 
Joint significance of SWIFT 
coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0103 0.0436 0.6071 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 1827 1982 1807 
Number of obs. 8464 11672 9842 
R2 0.6473 0.6866 0.6936 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. In this table we split our data 
in terciles between “Small”, “Medium” and “Large” firms. We use a mean of the Total Assets 
of each firm as size indicator to make the categorisation. The time period of our sample is 
1998-2005 (eight years). Standard errors in brackets are robust to heteroskedacity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form and are clustered by firm. All equations include a full set of 
country and year dummies.  
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